Drugs and Terrorism in the Australian News
Some responses to law-enforcement-related news articles today:
The Bulletin with Newsweek, 28 February: The Road To Hell
An excellent overview of the Bali 9 investigation and the members of that ill-fated criminal syndicate, concentrating (for once) not on hystrionics outside the courtroom or on tearful relatives, but on the events that led to the arrests, and the backgrounds of the now-convicted offenders.
"They never get the real ringleaders, just the little people. The nebulous Mr Big remains free while nine of his foot soldiers languish in Bali's Kerobokan prison, seven of them for life, two of them for death. It is always the way, in politics, war and crime.But what if there is no one hiding in the shadows, just a core of senior little people who have already been caught? And what if this "major organised crime gang", which police have actually described as having "tentacles", is in fact just a big bunch of minor thugs and losers from the wrong end of town?"
The author reveals some fascinating nuggets of information which cast the Bali 9 in a far different light than that in which they have been seen in recent months. Rather than being innocents blackmailed into compliance by an unknowable Mr Big, most had criminal records (Stephens and Lawrence were due to face court in Gosford for car theft; Czugaj reportedly has 14 minor dishonesty convictions; Rush is an intravenous drug user with a history of small-time drug and theft convictions). Lawrence claims Chan was the origin of the threats to kill the mules and their families; Chan was employed at the same Sydney company as Lawrence, Norman and Stephens. Lawrence, Nguyen and Norman reportedly had already brought heroin into Australia the same way once before in 2003, and there had been a second attempt aborted because the heroin had been sold by the supplier to a higher bidder.
Another interesting point concerns suggestions made by some (including letters in today's papers) that the decision of the AFP to provide intelligence regarding the presence of the drug traffickers in Bali to the Indonesian Police prevented the heroin from being traced to distributors in Australia. Apart from the (to me) obvious point that with drug investigations, one ideally wishes to trace the network in the direction of the supplier, not in the direction of the users, Toohey makes clear that the AFP information named other persons than the Bali 9. Some were believed to be potential mules who did not make the trip to Bali. Six people have since been arrested in Australia in connection with the case, have been charged with conspiracy to import, and will face committal in April. Toohey quotes AFP commissioner Keelty as saying that the AFP is not through charging people yet.
The article does not deal with the ethical or moral issue of whether the AFP should have provided the intelligence to the Indonesian Police, given that it was possible that a death penalty might be awarded, as has been the case for Chan and Sukumaran. (For discussion of this point, prior to the convictions, see my earlier post.) This is no longer a legal issue; lawyers representing two of the Bali 9 have made this argument in court in Australia, and the judges' decision was that the AFP's actions had been within the law and in accordance with their duties; and further that the AFP did not have a duty of care to protect would-be criminals from their own actions. In the words of one judge, "They are the authors of their own fates."
On an entirely different trial: the Australian trial of Joseph Thomas on charges of knowingly receiving funds from a terrorist organisation (Al-Qaeda), intentionally providing resources to a terrorist organisation (Al-Qaeda), and possessing a falsified Australian passport.
Todays reports in The Age and the Australian (I could not find the article in their online edition) focus on a statement by Thomas' lawyer Lex Lasry that the trial is a 'trophy trial' intended to show 'how hard Australian Federal Police were fighting to counter terrorism.' Lasry's unfounded suggestion aside, reports seem to indicate that there is thin evidence against Thomas.
True, Thomas did admit attending an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. True, Thomas did admit accepting a plane ticket home and US$3500 cash from Khaled bin Attash, a man who claimed to be a close associate of Bin Laden. Based on those admissions it seems likely that Thomas was, at the very least, a potential terrorist. Other points made underscore the difficulty of obtaining evidence to obtain a criminal conviction in this kind of matter: according to Lasry, the AFP failed to trace a money trail for the cash given to Thomas, so it is not clear that the funds constitute receiving funds from a terrorist organisation. Also according to Lasry, the AFP has failed to prove that bin Attash is linked to Al-Qaeda.
If accurate, reports may indicate that the charges levelled at Thomas were premature. Perhaps it would have been better to let him go and keep him under surveillance in the hopes that either he would incriminate himself or identify links to other potential terrorists. It seems likely that Thomas was engaged in something ill-smelling - false passport, Al-Qaeda training camp, cash and air ticket from a man who says he is a close associate of Bin Laden, and therefore either is Al-Qaeda, or wanted Thomas to think that he was - but the law requires that the prosecution prove guilt, not that the victim prove their innocence. The maxim that it is better to let a hundred guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man remains a foundation of our legal system, but the price of letting guilty men go free may be higher in this era of hijacked airliners and explosive belts than was once the case. Nonetheless it is a price we must pay if we are to remain a free society.
The Bulletin with Newsweek, 28 February: The Road To Hell
An excellent overview of the Bali 9 investigation and the members of that ill-fated criminal syndicate, concentrating (for once) not on hystrionics outside the courtroom or on tearful relatives, but on the events that led to the arrests, and the backgrounds of the now-convicted offenders.
"They never get the real ringleaders, just the little people. The nebulous Mr Big remains free while nine of his foot soldiers languish in Bali's Kerobokan prison, seven of them for life, two of them for death. It is always the way, in politics, war and crime.But what if there is no one hiding in the shadows, just a core of senior little people who have already been caught? And what if this "major organised crime gang", which police have actually described as having "tentacles", is in fact just a big bunch of minor thugs and losers from the wrong end of town?"
The author reveals some fascinating nuggets of information which cast the Bali 9 in a far different light than that in which they have been seen in recent months. Rather than being innocents blackmailed into compliance by an unknowable Mr Big, most had criminal records (Stephens and Lawrence were due to face court in Gosford for car theft; Czugaj reportedly has 14 minor dishonesty convictions; Rush is an intravenous drug user with a history of small-time drug and theft convictions). Lawrence claims Chan was the origin of the threats to kill the mules and their families; Chan was employed at the same Sydney company as Lawrence, Norman and Stephens. Lawrence, Nguyen and Norman reportedly had already brought heroin into Australia the same way once before in 2003, and there had been a second attempt aborted because the heroin had been sold by the supplier to a higher bidder.
Another interesting point concerns suggestions made by some (including letters in today's papers) that the decision of the AFP to provide intelligence regarding the presence of the drug traffickers in Bali to the Indonesian Police prevented the heroin from being traced to distributors in Australia. Apart from the (to me) obvious point that with drug investigations, one ideally wishes to trace the network in the direction of the supplier, not in the direction of the users, Toohey makes clear that the AFP information named other persons than the Bali 9. Some were believed to be potential mules who did not make the trip to Bali. Six people have since been arrested in Australia in connection with the case, have been charged with conspiracy to import, and will face committal in April. Toohey quotes AFP commissioner Keelty as saying that the AFP is not through charging people yet.
The article does not deal with the ethical or moral issue of whether the AFP should have provided the intelligence to the Indonesian Police, given that it was possible that a death penalty might be awarded, as has been the case for Chan and Sukumaran. (For discussion of this point, prior to the convictions, see my earlier post.) This is no longer a legal issue; lawyers representing two of the Bali 9 have made this argument in court in Australia, and the judges' decision was that the AFP's actions had been within the law and in accordance with their duties; and further that the AFP did not have a duty of care to protect would-be criminals from their own actions. In the words of one judge, "They are the authors of their own fates."
On an entirely different trial: the Australian trial of Joseph Thomas on charges of knowingly receiving funds from a terrorist organisation (Al-Qaeda), intentionally providing resources to a terrorist organisation (Al-Qaeda), and possessing a falsified Australian passport.
Todays reports in The Age and the Australian (I could not find the article in their online edition) focus on a statement by Thomas' lawyer Lex Lasry that the trial is a 'trophy trial' intended to show 'how hard Australian Federal Police were fighting to counter terrorism.' Lasry's unfounded suggestion aside, reports seem to indicate that there is thin evidence against Thomas.
True, Thomas did admit attending an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. True, Thomas did admit accepting a plane ticket home and US$3500 cash from Khaled bin Attash, a man who claimed to be a close associate of Bin Laden. Based on those admissions it seems likely that Thomas was, at the very least, a potential terrorist. Other points made underscore the difficulty of obtaining evidence to obtain a criminal conviction in this kind of matter: according to Lasry, the AFP failed to trace a money trail for the cash given to Thomas, so it is not clear that the funds constitute receiving funds from a terrorist organisation. Also according to Lasry, the AFP has failed to prove that bin Attash is linked to Al-Qaeda.
If accurate, reports may indicate that the charges levelled at Thomas were premature. Perhaps it would have been better to let him go and keep him under surveillance in the hopes that either he would incriminate himself or identify links to other potential terrorists. It seems likely that Thomas was engaged in something ill-smelling - false passport, Al-Qaeda training camp, cash and air ticket from a man who says he is a close associate of Bin Laden, and therefore either is Al-Qaeda, or wanted Thomas to think that he was - but the law requires that the prosecution prove guilt, not that the victim prove their innocence. The maxim that it is better to let a hundred guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man remains a foundation of our legal system, but the price of letting guilty men go free may be higher in this era of hijacked airliners and explosive belts than was once the case. Nonetheless it is a price we must pay if we are to remain a free society.
posted by Hiraethin at 5:02 pm
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